Balkans 2010: Report of an independent task
force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive
Action
RELIEF WEB
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
Date: 9 Dec 2002
Balkans 2010: Report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the states of the former Yugoslavia, the last decade was characterized by
autocratic governance, armed conflict, and ethnic cleansing. Ever since the
fighting ended, the international community and some local leaders have
recognized that systemic political, economic, and social reforms are needed to
build legitimacy, transparency, and the rule of law. But it hasn't happened yet.
The Center for Preventive Action, a project of the Council on Foreign Relations,
designed the "Balkans 2010" Independent Task Force as an endeavor to prevent
conflict by promoting tangible, practical recommendations for self-sustaining
peace and development in the region.1 The Task Force's mandate was threefold: to
identify the key stakeholders - including governments, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the business and
financial communities - in the Balkan region; to craft realistic, specific
recommendations targeted at those stakeholders and at the political and economic
leaders of the Balkan governments; and to take a "carrots and sticks" approach
to conflict prevention and political development, paying particular attention to
measures that strengthen those who pursue modernization and moderation while
weakening those who espouse irredentism and stagnation.
The Task Force was convened before September 11, 2001, when the violence in
Macedonia still received prominent international play as an early test of the
then-new Bush administration, and when the fall of Serbian president Slobodan
Milosevic was still recent enough to leave open the question of what
international involvement would be appropriate and necessary in the newly
democratic region as it struggled with its transition toward a broader European
structure. After September 11, the international resources and attention shifted
from the region - but the need for sustained commitment by the international
community continues.
Accordingly, the Task Force has focused its recommendations on specific actions
that will wisely use the resources that remain on the most important Western
interests: preventing the region from becoming a vacuum in which organized crime
and terrorism predominate and poverty fuels migration to Europe and America; and
building partners in southeast Europe to help reach out to countries in Central
Asia and the Middle East, where the challenges of the next generation will be
felt. In effect, the Task Force proposes an agenda that, while not wholly new,
acknowledges that the international community faces new challenges after
September 11 and seeks to prepare the region to help in meeting those
challenges.
The Task Force believes that outsiders can and should be encouraged to mobilize
the political will and forge the specific policies and programs necessary to
avert further deadly conflict and achieve a sustainable peace. In keeping with
the Center for Preventive Action's founding mission, the Task Force's goal was
to devise recommendations that provide realistic road maps for action and to
formulate incentives that change how leaders define their interests, not to
resort to a series of moralizing "oughts," "shoulds," and "musts."
The Balkan violence of the 1990s has run its course.With democratic governments
in all of the former Yugoslav republics and regionwide ambitions to join the
European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there is no
longer a risk of major war between states. The Dayton Agreement ended the brutal
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and continues to provide both a framework
for that country to move toward Europe and the means to root out the ethnic
separatism that still holds it back. In Kosovo, the repression of the ethnic
Albanians has ended and work has begun to rebuild that damaged society. Slobodan
Milosevic, the primary architect of the decade's violence, is on trial for his
crimes at the international tribunal in The Hague.Across the states and regions
of the former Yugoslavia, democratic governments share a common ambition to join
the EU and NATO.
Nevertheless, sources of instability remain. Economic stagnation has generated
unemployment and underemployment. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and
displaced families still await return or resettlement. Money for reconstruction
and development is inadequate. Prominent accused war criminals remain at large.
Key institutions have resisted reform. Political and legal reform are impeded by
corruption and by entrenched obstructionist forces - including organized crime
syndicates - that rely on extremism and aggression to advance narrow, personal,
or ethnically driven claims and grievances. Neglecting these challenges will
have severe and destabilizing consequences for southeast Europe, including
growing poverty; an increase in illegal economic activity, including trafficking
in people and drugs; further human displacement; and a greater likelihood of
political extremism, insurgency, and terrorism.
A renewal of conflict, however limited, would be devastating for the region and
beyond. It would be an especially serious blow to Europe, raising the specter of
increased refugee flows. But it would also have an impact on U.S. interests.
Renewed conflict would be a policy failure with damaging implications for Balkan
Muslims and for U.S. relations with the broader Muslim world. It would be an
unwelcome diversion from other priorities; would increase the amount of drug and
other trafficking that reaches Europe and beyond; and would enable terrorists to
use the region as a transit hub or a haven.
Reversion to violence can be avoided through continued, albeit reconfigured and
rebalanced, engagement by Europe and the United States. It is in the United
States' and the EU's interests to provide the "carrots and sticks" that will
keep Balkan governments on the path of progress and reform.These efforts will be
more effective if the United States and the EU act in harmony. Failure to do so
could result in a costlier and more dangerous intervention down the line and act
as an unnecessary irritant in EU-U.S. relations.
The Task Force's overall vision for the Balkans centers on its integration into
Europe - both formally, in terms of shared structures and institutions, and
informally, in terms of shared norms and ideals. A coordinated international
effort with shared objectives and clear lines of responsibility can, in
cooperation with reform-oriented local leaders, put the Balkan states on the
path to full integration with western Europe by 2010. Such an effort will
encourage and assist a wide-ranging transformation of the political, economic,
and legal systems in the region that will make it possible, over the next six to
eight years, for the international community to reduce its presence in an
orderly fashion and transfer responsibilities to capable indigenous actors and
institutions.2
The main outside actors in the Balkan region are drawn from four groups:
governments, supranational and international organizations, NGOs, and the
commercial sector.From this assortment, certain key players - stakeholders -
emerge.These stakeholders possess the political, economic, social, and military
means to influence, cajole, or compel the Balkan governments to act in ways
consistent with the development of democratic governance, market economies,
civil societies, and ethnically integrated militaries under civilian democratic
control. Among governments, the key stakeholders are the United States and
certain member states of the EU, particularly Germany, Greece, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and France. Among supranational and international organizations, the
most important stakeholder in the Balkans is the EU, with NATO, the United
Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and, for
the time being, the ad hoc civilian international operations in the region -
chiefly the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina - playing significant
roles.Within the nongovernmental sector, a considerable international presence
comprised of Western grant-making foundations, advocacy groups, and service
providers - such as the Soros foundations network, the International Crisis
Group, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the International Rescue
Committee - operate on the grassroots level to promote democracy, transparency,
and civil society development, to train local partners, and to provide
humanitarian relief. Finally, the business community in the Balkans, though
nascent, is attracting European and American investors through the opening of
markets and the widespread privatization of state-owned industries.This opening
to business remains contingent upon the strengthening of property rights, reform
of commercial laws and civil courts, and the region's overall stability.3
Europeans have the most direct and obvious interests in preventing further
Balkan chaos: an economic interest in developing markets and trade routes with
the region, and a security interest in protecting the frontier of the European
Union against criminal activity, instability, and refugee flows. The EU is
taking the lead in providing economic and technical assistance and encouraging
political reform and stability in the Balkans, with the aim of elevating the
Balkan states' standards of economic and political governance to EU norms. As
the single largest assistance donor to the countries of the former Yugoslavia,
with $4.65 billion committed from the European Commission budget for 2000-2006
(in addition to bilateral aid and the provision of peacekeeping troops from
member states), the EU and its agencies - including the European Investment Bank
(EIB) and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) - will be at the core of
reform and modernization efforts.The EU's Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP) lays out actions required to join the union, with incentives for reform
and disincentives for backsliding. This process is the fundamental road map for
progress toward a closer association with Europe.
The United States is also a key stakeholder in the Balkans.The United States
shares the EU's security concerns and has other longstanding interests in the
region as well. Since 1945, American administrations of both parties have
accepted the premise that American security and economic interests require a
peaceful and stable Europe. Continued U.S. engagement will reassure its partners
of America's commitment to democracy and stability in the region and contribute
to fulfillment of the vision of a "Europe whole and free." The new countries
created from the former Yugoslavia are also strategically important as a bridge
to current or aspirant EU and NATO members - Greece,Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Romania - and to the Middle East. As noted above, abandoning the Muslim
populations of Bosnia and Kosovo to face new threats from their neighbors will
further reduce America's standing in the Muslim world and may encourage Balkan
Muslims to turn to religious militants, rather than to Europe, for protection.
Put simply, America's security will suffer if the Balkans slide toward division,
lawlessness, and religious or ethnic conflict.
The U.S. interest is to support the Balkan states' efforts to reform - in
particular using its influence in NATO to ensure a stable security situation and
to guide military reform - while recognizing, and supporting, the European
Union's lead role in providing political, economic, and technical assistance.
Based on current spending patterns,
the Task Force estimates that the United States will spend $8 billion to $12
billion on military operations and $2 billion to $3.5 billion on assistance to
the Balkan region between now and 2010.4 A continued U.S. commitment at this
level is essential to the successful transformation of the region.Working
together between now and 2010, the European Union and the United States can
shepherd the Balkans along the path to full integration into Europe.5
NATO's military commitment in the Balkans includes the Stabilization Force (SFOR)
in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, and Operation Amber Fox in
Macedonia. It is important to recognize that approximately 85 percent of the
forces in these NATO operations are non-U.S. forces. Beyond its peacekeeping
responsibilities (which, in Bosnia, have included the capture of suspected war
criminals), NATO is also involved in the region through its Partnership for
Peace (PFP) program and Membership Action Plan (MAP).Taken together, these
programs are the means by which Balkan countries can develop their own military
and police forces, under democratic civilian control, that are professional and
in the service of the state and its citizenry.
The World Bank disburses loans, grants, and technical and development assistance
through its offices located in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, and Belgrade (for Serbia and Montenegro). A joint World Bank -
European Commission Office on southeast Europe acts as a clearinghouse for donor
countries and organizations; it coordinates aid projects in the region, provides
needs assessments, devises strategies for regional development, and mobilizes
support among donors. It does not disburse loans.
The carrots available to the Balkan governments from these stakeholders are
abundant. As befits its primary role in the development of the region, the
European Union has the most to offer. In return for continued peace, stability,
and political and economic reform, the countries earn closer association with
European institutions and structures, including privileged political and
economic relations and favorable trade terms on most goods. Both the European
Union and the United States also offer economic, technical, and reconstruction
assistance. Development assistance, largely in the form of loans, is also
available from the World Bank. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the
granting of normal trade relations is another carrot that the United States can
offer in return for economic reform.Active involvement in NATO's PFP and MAP
will enable states to reform and improve their militaries; develop
interoperability with NATO; and prepare force structures, procedures, and
capabilities for possible future membership.
The primary stick at the disposal of these stakeholders is conditionality - the
linking of international assistance to specific performance goals.
Conditionality is effective when the international community, especially the
United States and the EU, speaks with one voice, because it puts pressure on
local leaders to make difficult and unpopular changes and gives them political
cover for doing so. It can be used to overcome popular and institutional
resistance to the enactment of reform legislation for economic restructuring and
privatization; to the elimination of discriminatory laws and practices; to the
reform of the military, police, and judiciary; and to cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).6
The Task Force recommends, however, that conditions be set in broad terms, with
time limits sufficiently liberal to allow local actors some leeway in achieving
the required standards. Inflexible and arbitrary cut-off dates can be
counterproductive when substantial progress toward the required standards is
underway. But when there is continuous failure to abide by conditions - for
example, when corruption is massive and institutionalized, and no action is
being taken to eradicate it - the international community must be willing to
halt its funding to demonstrate the consequences of inaction.7
Two of the other major stakeholders in the region - UNMIK in Kosovo and the OHR
in Bosnia - have different means of persuasion at their disposal. Both UNMIK and
the OHR have direct policy responsibilities in their assigned areas. Kosovo is
essentially a UN protectorate and UNMIK, in cooperation with the EU office in
Kosovo and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
continues to perform many of its basic administrative and governmental
functions. The OHR, meanwhile, oversees the implementation of the civilian
aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement and can impose legislation and dismiss
obstructive officials.The Task Force recommends that these ad hoc organizations
be gradually phased out in favor of indigenous institutions and a smaller
international presence, with the European Union taking the lead.8 However, for
the moment they are effective, if unrepresentative, tools for pushing through
difficult or unpopular reforms in Kosovo, and especially in Bosnia.
External stakeholders are, obviously, only a part of the whole picture - the
ultimate goal for the international community in the region is to turn over
responsibility to local leaders who are accountable to their fellow citizens and
who support democratic values. In this respect, the signs are somewhat
encouraging.With Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman gone,
for the first time all the states in the region are essentially democratic and
committed to building market economies.
Nevertheless, there is still a risk of backsliding in the region: the security
situation in Macedonia remains tenuous; the coalition government in Serbia is
irretrievably splintered; and in Kosovo all the political parties are organized
around ethnic objectives and pander to nationalist sentiment. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, meanwhile, the elections in October 2002 - which resulted in
presidential victories for the three main nationalist parties at the expense of
their moderate competitors - demonstrate that nationalist feelings remain
potent. One reason for these trends is the increasing discontent of local
populations whose embrace of the West has failed to bring immediate improvements
in their standard of living. Disturbingly, parties uninterested in bringing
their countries closer to the European mainstream could benefit in elections
over the next few years. The hard truth is that, while all the major parties in
such states as Bulgaria and Romania - as in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic earlier - have endorsed their countries' continued efforts to join the
European Union and NATO, such an outcome is not preordained for the states of
the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia. Irredentist, criminal,
and antidemocratic forces will try to exploit people's frustration brought on by
the difficulties inherent in transitions, and it is these elements that must be
countered through active engagement by the European Union, the United States,
and the United Nations. These stakeholders, and the international community as a
whole, need to make clear the economic, political, and security benefits of
cooperation and reform, and they must also be equally explicit about the
penalties - including the withholding of financial aid and international
isolation - for regression, obstructionism, or the use of violence.
Footnotes
1 The particular areas covered in this report include Serbia and Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and the UN-administered Kosovo.
Slovenia is not included in the report.
2 In terms of the security presence in the region, it should be noted that the
Task Force believes that it is essential that NATO's military commitment to the
Balkans continue, even if the size and nature - from security forces to security
developmentforces - of NATO's presence change over time. This is important for
psychological as well as deterrent reasons. For more on this argument, see
Appendixes A-1 to A-3.
3 For an overview of international involvement in the region, and for
information on the Balkan governments, see Appendix F.
4 These estimates are based on an extrapolation of fiscal year (FY) 2003
figures. The military cost is based on a reduction of forces to between 4,000
and 6,000 U.S. soldiers in the region through 2010, with a faster draw-down
depending on an improved security environment for minorities in Kosovo. It
should be noted that some members of the Task Force believe that it is necessary
for U.S. forces to remain at current levels in Bosnia and Kosovo, at least until
the principal reforms outlined in the report have been successfully implemented
and the threat from extremist elements has been eliminated. Currently the U.S.
military provides approximately 15 percent of the forces in Bosnia and Kosovo.
5 Though the United States continues to have the most influence of any foreign
state in the Balkans, Germany, Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom are also
important players. Germany has committed a total of ?614 million ($598 million)
between 2000 and 2003 for Stability Pact purposes and also disburses smaller
amounts annually as part of its regular bilateral development cooperation with
southeast Europe. Germany is also a main bilateral donor in Kosovo. Meanwhile,
Italy has set aside approximately ?196 million ($191 million) for bilateral
initiatives and soft loans to Balkan countries for the years 2001-2003, in
addition to its contributions to the EU aid budget. At the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia donors conference in June 2001, Italy pledged the most of any
individual donor, committing over ?115 million ($112 million) to Serbia and
Montenegro's reconstruction. The United Kingdom contributes approximately 17
percent of all EU aid to the region. Finally,Greece is implementing a Hellenic
Plan for Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans - separate from the EU aid
policy to the region - with a provisional budget of ?550 million ($536 million),
and is also active in facilitating trade and investment incentives and
infrastructure rehabilitation in the region.
6 Direct relief and support to refugees are not to be affected by conditionality
regimes.
7 The best example of the positive use of conditionality occurred with the
transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague tribunal in 2001; strict enforcement
by the United States of deadlines provided the Serbian government with the
motivation to take action on time.
